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IN THE SUPREME COURT OP THE STATE OF UTAH

SHAUNA F. HODGES,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

Case No. 20929

GIBSON PRODUCTS COMPANY, d/b/a
GIBSON'S DISCOUNT CENTER, a
Utah corporation, and CHAD
CROSGROVE, an individual,
Defendants-Appellants.

REPLY BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE HONORABLE JOHN A. ROKICH, DISTRICT JUDGE, PRESIDING

F. ROBERT BAYLE
ANDREA C. ALCABES
BAYLE, HANSON, NELSON & CHIPMAN
1300 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for
Defendants-Appellants
THOMAS R. KARRENBERG
HANSEN & ANDERSON
50 West Broadway, Sixth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for
Plaintiff-Respondent
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Defendants-Appellants Gibson Products Company, Inc.f hereinafter Gibson's, and Chad Crosgrove submit the following brief in
reply to that filed by Plaintiff-Respondent.

ARGUMENT

POINT I: THE ISSUE OF WRONGFUL DISCHARGE
WAS IMPROPERLY SUBMITTED TO THE JURY
This Court has once again reaffirmed its adherence to the "atwill" doctrine, reserving only limited instances in which the doctrine
does not apply. Rose v. Allied Development Co., 34 Utah Adv. Rep. 29
May 13 (1986). None of the limited exceptions set forth in Rose apply
in this case.
The Court in Rose reiterated that an employer could not violate
state or federal law or breach a contract when firing an employee
and then escape liability. If neither of those circumstances exist,
however, employment "is no more than an indefinite general hiring
which is terminable at the will of either party."

Bihlmaier v.

Carson, 603 P. 2d 790 (Utah 1979), at 792. Ms. Hodges has neither
plead nor proved that either stated exception applies. The instruction
given to the jury on the issue of wrongful discharge therefore was not
a proper statement of Utah law and Defendants-Appellants were
prejudiced by the trial court's submission of the issue to the jury.
The policy behind the doctrine is sound and should again be
upheld by this Court. The brief of Defendants-Appellants previously
filed with the Court cites numerous cases which set out important
considerations supporting the preservation of the "at will" doctrine.
-1-

Further, the jury's finding of "wrongful" discharge was unsupported by the evidence presented at trial. The Defendants-Appellants
in good faith believed that the accusations were true and that the
employment relationship had been damaged as a result. This forms a
reasonable basis for the firing and negates any "wrongful" motive
on the part of Defendants.
Because wrongful discharge is not a viable cause of action in
Utah except under limited circumstances not present in this case and
because Plaintiff-Respondent failed to establish that either of the
Defendants-Appellants acted wrongfully, the jury's verdict should
be set aside.

POINT II: THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT
EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE JURY'S VERDICT
REGARDING MALICIOUS PROSECUTION
The Plaintiff-Respondent failed to prove the necessary elements
of a cause of action for malicious prosecution: that DefendantsAppellants did not have probable cause for initiating the proceedings;
that Defendants-Appellants acted primarily for a purpose other than
bringing an offender to justice; and that the action was terminated
in favor of Plaintiff-Respondent.
The Plaintiff-Respondent's argument in Point I of her brief
relies on a premise which is not substantiated by the evidence: That
Chad Crosgrove really committed the theft with which Ms. Hodges was
charged and Defendants-Appellants knew that to be the case when
presenting evidence to the prosecutor. From this assertion PlaintiffRespondent concludes that Defendants-Appellants did not have probable
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cause to present evidence to the prosecutor and that they did not
fully disclose all material facts concerning the loss.
Defendants-Appellants, however, did have probable cause to
suspect Plaintiff-Respondent of theft and to proceed with police
investigation of the matter. At the time of meeting with the police,
Defendants-Appellants presented the discrepancy discovered between
the cash and register receipts, information concerning Ms. Hodges1
access to the cash and receipts, and the register tapes and checking
account deposit slip from Ms. Hodges1 personal account. This was all
of the information available to Defendants-Respondents with regard
to the loss.
Additionally, Defendants-Appellants were relying upon the knowledge and advice of the prosecutor to determine whether their evidence
was sufficient to prosecute.

There is no evidence that employees

of Gibson's interfered with the decision to prosecute Ms. Hodges.
It was up to the prosecutor to decide if further information was
required or if he could proceed based upon the information at hand.
This decision, if in error, should not create liability in these
Defendants.
Contrary to Plaintiff-Appellant's assertions, none of Defendants' agents "directed" the prosecutor to dismiss the charges against
Ms. Hodges. Mr. Dever, the prosecutor, elected not to proceed based
on his judgment of the potential for obtaining a verdict against Ms.
Hodges.

(TR 112)

The Defendants-Appellants were further prejudiced by the Court's
erroneous direction to the jury that the dismissal of charges was a
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resolution in Plaintiff's favor.

Mr, Dever did not dismiss the

charges against Ms, Hodges because he believed she was innocent, but
because circumstances had made it difficult to present a case - his
primary witness could not testify.
Plaintiff-Respondent can sustain her cause of action for malicious prosecution only by proving that Defendants-Appellants initiated prosecution of Ms. Hodges for an improper purpose. PlaintiffRespondent's argument is based on the assumption that Chad Crosgrove
committed the theft with which she was charged.
that Gibson's knew this to be the truth.

It further assumes

Neither of Plaintiff-

Respondent's assumptions were substantiated by the evidence nor were
they submitted to the jury for determination. Plaintiff-Respondent
has failed to prove the necessary elements of her claim for malicious
prosecution and the jury's verdict should be set aside.

POINT III. THE ISSUE OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
WAS ERRONEOUSLY SUBMITTED TO THE JURY
AND THE JURYVS AWARD OF SUCH DAMAGES IS
NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.
In support of an award of punitive damages, Plaintiff-Respondent
again relies upon the premise that Chad Crosgrove committed the theft
with which she was charged without providing proof and without
submitting that issue to the jury. The Plaintiff-Respondent did not
prove that Defendants-Appellants acted maliciously, recklessly or
with a knowing disregard of Ms. Hodges' rights. Rather, DefendantsAppellants showed that their actions were prompted by a reasonable
belief of Plaintiff-Respondent's guilt.
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Even if Plaintiff-Respondent had proven Chad Crosgrove committed
the theft for which she was prosecutedf which Defendants-Appellants
denyf Crosgrove's acts could not be fairly imputed to Gibson's. Such
acts would not be of benefit to Gibson's and give no basis for
liability against Gibson's for punitive damages.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set out in the brief and this reply brief of
Defendants-Appellants, the jury's verdict in this case should be set
aside.

The issues of wrongful discharge and punitive damages were

improperly submitted to the jury. Moreoverf the jury's findings on
these issues as well as on the issues of malicious prosecution and
special damages are not supported by the evidence.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

/^ ~ day of September, 1986.
BAYLE, HANSON, NELSON & CHIPMAN

P. ROBERT BAYLE? I

ANDREA C. ALCABES
Attorneys for
Defendants-Appellants
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this

/£ ** day of September, 1986f I

served the foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS upon
Plaintiff-Respondent by mailing four copies of the same, postage
prepaid, to:
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent:
Mr. Thomas R. Karrenberg
Attorney at Law
HANSEN & ANDERSON
50 West Broadway, Sixth Floor
Salt Lake Cityf Utah 84101
BAYLE, HANSON, NELSON & CHIPMAN
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F.. ROBERT BAYLE,/ '
Attorney for
Defendants-Appellants
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